





























Ethics and epistemology are close philosophical disciplines which frequently overlap (Brown, 2017). One             
intersection between the two domains is the study of blameworthiness and the nature of epistemic and                
moral blame. In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of               
epistemic blame in its entirety. This view, which I refer to as 'epistemic blame scepticism', seems to                 
challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of                
moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against                  
two epistemic blame sceptics, Dougherty (2012) and Boult (draft), defusing their criticisms and restoring              
belief in the distinct form of epistemic blame. I discuss a favourable argument for epistemic blame                
(Nottelmann, 2007) before providing original defences against Dougherty and Boult's attempt to refute             
his claims. I then present and offer my own response to what I perceive to be the biggest challenge to                    
epistemic blame, drawing from areas of epistemic deontology that have yet to be discussed in this                
literature. Finally, I present a new objection against epistemic scepticism which highlights how, if              
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1.   Introduction 
 
Talk of responsibilities, duties, and blameworthiness is a widespread phenomenon in the fields of              
epistemology and ethics. These fields frequently draw from one another, and the exploration of epistemic               
and moral blame is one of the most recent examples of this overlap (Brown, 2017). The discussion of                  
epistemic blame is not just limited to epistemology and ethics, but is also pervasive in our everyday lives                  
and plays an important part in society. Our everyday language implies a concept of epistemic blame as we                  
often talk of holding people accountable for their beliefs, stating that one 'should have known better' or                 
'they ought to believe that x' (Cusimano, 2012). We also have special kinds of words and concepts for                  
people who are notoriously irresponsible or bad believers, as opposed to when their beliefs are excusable.                
These different concepts seem to rely on the idea that we can be responsible and blameworthy believers.  
1
In recent literature, however, some epistemologists have questioned the notion of epistemic blame and              
rejected it in its entirety. I will refer to this stance as ‘epistemic blame scepticism’, and will be focusing                   
my attention on the epistemic blame sceptics Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​). In short, epistemic               
blame sceptics reject the claim that there is a distinctive form of epistemic blame, often ​reducing apparent                 
cases of such to moral or practical blame. From this reasoning, sceptics claim that the notion of epistemic                  
blameworthiness becomes redundant, meaning there is no need for it to exist in the literature, as a distinct                  
form of epistemic blame would over-complicate the taxonomy and direct attention away from the real               
type of blame at hand.  
The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against Dougherty’s (2012) and                 
Boult’s (​draft​) sceptical arguments, defusing their criticisms and restoring belief in a distinct form of               
epistemic blame. 
The plan of this paper is as follows: I will begin section two by introducing epistemic blame and the                   
account of blame I will be referring to in this paper. I will then present a brief overview of epistemic                    
blame’s place in society and the literature on epistemology, as well as detailing the account of blame that                  
Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​) are rejecting. Moving onto section three, I will present the argument                
for epistemic blame scepticism. As already stated, I will focus on both Dougherty and Boult’s reductionist                
1 ​There are a variety of positive reasons to believe in epistemic blame. For examples, see literature regarding 
blameless norm violations (Lackey, 2007) and the norms of assertion (Williamson, 1996), as well as discussions on 
the popularity of epistemic blameworthiness in society (Nottelmann, 2007).  
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argument against epistemic blame, outlining the key components ​of their views and their similarities. In               
section four I will begin to critically assess the sceptical argument. Here, I will present an argument in                  
favour of a distinct form of epistemic blame, offered by Nottelmann (2007), who claims that moral                
culpability presupposes epistemic culpability which demonstrates how moral and epistemic blame are            
distinct. I will then assess Dougherty’s and Boult’s rejection of Nottelmann’s argument, who are critical               
of the favourable conclusions that Nottelmann’s argument presents for epistemic blame. In section five, I               
will critically examine an objection put forth by Boult in favour of epistemic scepticism, known as the                 
‘argument from epistemic purism’, which I ​believe is also shared by Dougherty (2014). According to               
Boult (​draft​), this is a concerning view which proponents of epistemic blame must commit to. From here,                 
I will resist this objection by appealing to Stapleford’s (2015) argument against the collapsing ​of               
epistemic duties, arguing that both Dougherty and Boult’s own understanding and division of the              
normative domains is far more concerning than the proponent of epistemic blame’s commitment to              
epistemic purism. In section six, I present my own objection to the sceptical argument, which I refer to as                   
the ‘semantic objection’. Here, I will claim that even if Dougherty’s and Boult’s sceptical argument               
against epistemic blame is granted, the consequences are not as influential as they desire them to be as                  
their arguments are only semantically concerning at most. I will investigate Dougherty and Boult’s efforts               
to resist this claim, detailing why I find their efforts dissatisfying. I will conclude this paper by                 
summarising the debate and leaving some remarks on further research and the direction others interested               
in this topic could explore.  
 
2. Introducing Epistemic Blame 
 
We routinely make judgements about what one ought to or ought not to believe. You ought not to believe                   
falsehoods, or believe without sufficient evidence or justification, for example. When we make these              
judgements, we often respond negatively when people fail to comply. We acknowledge that they have               
failed in some sense, or done something wrong, and we regard them blameworthy by holding them                
responsible for these wrongdoings. Arguably, this form of blame is epistemic in its nature, in that it is an                   
epistemic evaluation made about an epistemic action or lack of action. As Cusimano (2012) notes,               
philosophers traditionally associate the goal of truth as one of the defining features of the epistemic realm                 
and the responsibilities associated with this are also concerned with achieving the truth. Arguably, it               
seems to naturally follow from this that if the epistemic responsibilities are epistemic in nature, the                
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blameworthiness that we attribute is due to a failure to carry out an epistemic responsibility, so is itself                  
epistemic. 
Having discussed a folk understanding of epistemic blame, we can now examine how it is defined in                 
contemporary literature. As mentioned in my introduction, epistemologists have often discussed epistemic            
blame and blamelessness in their literature (see DeRose, 2002, Montmarquet, 1993, Lackey, 2007, Kelp              
and Simion, 2017 and Aristotle, 2009). More recently a variety of different accounts of epistemic blame                
have been proposed (Fricker, 2016, Brown, 2017, Sliwa ​draft​, Simion​, draft) ​These accounts of epistemic               
blame can be categorized as falling under the following four categories; traditionalism, conativism,             
functionalism or performance (Simion, ​draft​) . Traditionalist accounts of epistemic blame are reductionist            
2
and prescribe to either an emotivist or cognitivist understanding of blame. The former defines blame as an                 
emotion or set of emotions (Strawson, 1962), and the latter as believing or judging someone as                
blameworthy (Watson, 1996). Conative accounts of blame emphasize motivational elements, where you            
believe someone is blameworthy, and you desire they did not carry out the blameworthy action ​(Sher,                
2006). Functionalist accounts of blame are anti-reductionist, and view blame as an internally diverse              
practice. For example, the function of blameworthiness may be essentially communicative (Fricker,            
2016), or it may be that the function of blame is to protest (McGeer, 2013). Lastly, a performative account                   
of blameworthiness views blame as a performative speech act, alike to ‘marrying’ or ‘promising’. To say                
you blame someone is to make a judgement but is also an action which requires a response (Simion,                  
draft​).  
Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​) are not explicit in defining epistemic blame with regards to any of the                  
above accounts. Nevertheless, I believe we can successfully interpret their account of blame as              
traditionalist and cognitive by focusing on their viewpoint of epistemic blame as a response to failure.                
With this in mind, I will refer to this account of blame throughout my paper. I will remain neutral as to                     
whether this is the correct account of epistemic blame and will agree with Dougherty and Boult in order                  
to fair and not misdirect my objections.  
Boult considers two definitions of epistemic blame which he believes are both disarmed by his sceptical                
argument; “epistemic blameworthiness” can be read as referring to either a distinctively epistemic kind of               
blameworthiness, or blameworthiness for merely epistemic failings” (Boult, ​draft​, p.6). Despite           
remarking that epistemologists are often unclear about the distinction between the two readings, yet,              
2 I am aware that these categories of blame may sometimes overlap with each other and the taxonomy perhaps is not 
as distinct (Coates and Tognazzini, 2014). 
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arguably Boult does little to explain the distinction himself. He does, however, expand on what he                
considers an epistemic failing account of blameworthiness to be, which is when blame is determined by                
the kind of failing one is blameworthy for. For example, if I commit an epistemic failing, such as                  
believing an unjustified proposition, the blameworthiness attributed to me would apparently be epistemic,             
based on the type of failing it was (Boult, ​draft​). Defining blame as a ‘failure’ is arguably both                  
traditionalist and cognitive, in that it assumes a standard which one judges that an agent has failed to                  
achieve. For example, Watson (1996), a proponent of the cognitive account of blame, argues that to blame                 
someone is to judge that they have failed with respect to some standard of excellence. 
Dougherty is also inexplicit in what account of epistemic blame he is sceptical of and focuses more on                  
defining epistemic irresponsibility as opposed to epistemic blameworthiness. However, he is clear to still              
direct his sceptical concerns towards a distinct form of epistemic blame “the basis of epistemic               
blameworthiness is epistemic...this is just the sort of picture I am opposing” (Dougherty, 2012, p.536).               
Again, like Boult, we can define Dougherty’s account of epistemic blame as traditionalist and cognitive.               
Dougherty notes that responsibilists perceive displays of epistemic irresponsibility as a normative failing,             
which is a failure in fulfilling one’s telos. Like Boult then, blameworthiness is tied to a failure in                  
achieving a ‘telos’ or standard, which, as we have seen, is categorized as traditionalist and cognitive . 
3
In explaining the notion of epistemic blame and detailing the positions of my opponents, I have set up the                   
basis for the epistemic blame sceptic’s critique. ​Armed with a clear, unified account of how we should                 
understand epistemic blame, we can now move on to the next section of this paper and discuss the                  
argument for epistemic blame scepticism.  
 
 3.    What is Epistemic Blame Scepticism? 
 
Despite, as outlined, the initial appeal and popularity of epistemic blame, the sceptical position claims that                
epistemic blame is not a distinct form of blame, as cases of blameworthiness for breaking epistemic                
3 ​It is worth noting here that a traditionalist account of blame does not tend to account for epistemic blame, which 
supports my interpretation of Dougherty’s (2012) and Boult’s (​draft​) understanding of epistemic blame, as well as 
making my argument more significant (Simion, ​draft​). 
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norms are better explained as examples of moral or practical blameworthiness. I will be detailing the                
stances of two prominent sceptics about epistemic blame—Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​).  
 
3.1 Dougherty's 'Reducing' of Epistemic Responsibility 
 
Dougherty presents a variety of arguments in favour of epistemic blame scepticism, centred around the               
key claim that epistemic responsibility can be 'reduced' . What Dougherty means by this claim, is that                
4
cases which appear to concern a distinct type of epistemic responsibility can be 'reduced', into other types                 
of blame. Epistemic responsibility or blame identifies with other forms of blame on a base level, so                 
arguably, there is no need to overcomplicate matters and define these types of blame as epistemic,                
especially not as ​distinctively​ epistemic. 
According to Dougherty (2014), most cases of seemingly epistemic blameworthiness are either cases of              
moral or instrumental blameworthiness, or cases where no blame should be attributed at all. More               
specifically, Dougherty claims that cases of epistemic blameworthiness are not part of epistemology, and              
should be understood as falling within the domain of applied ethics, on par with medical and business                 
ethics in that it is an aspect of ethical theory applied to a certain domain (Dougherty, 2014). 
Dougherty summarises his reductionist argument in the form of his 'identity thesis', understood as              
follows; 
IT: Each instance of [so-called] epistemic irresponsibility is just an instance of purely non-epistemic              
irresponsibility/irrationality (either moral or instrumental). 
(Dougherty 2012, p.537) 
It is important to note here that Dougherty still believes in a form of epistemic normativity, but that it                   
does not lead to a robust 'ethics of belief' which responsibilists believe in. The only epistemic demands,                 
4 I will infer that Dougherty's use of 'responsibility' is interchangeable with 'blameworthiness'. I am aware that the 
notions of responsibility and blameworthiness can come apart (Scanlon, 1998, 2008), however, due to word 
constraints I will not be discussing this material in this paper.  
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and thus epistemic forms of responsibility and blameworthiness, are ones relating to evidential fit .              
5
Dougherty argues that epistemic 'oughts' should only be understood as the following; 
 
(EO) ​One epistemically-ought to believe p if and only if p fits one's evidence. 
(Dougherty 2014, p.10) 
 
Dougherty provides further support for his reductionist thesis by presenting an example to demonstrate              
how epistemic blame collapses into either moral or instrumental blame. We can briefly sketch this               
example now to further illustrate how Dougherty explains away an intuitive case of epistemic              
blameworthiness. 
 
Craig the Creationist 
Craig is a dysfunctional agent. He believes in creationism, the view that the universe and living organisms                 
originate from acts of divine creation, as opposed to natural processes such as evolution. Craig was raised                 
within a community of creationist believers. His parents believed in creationism, his school taught and               
favoured creationism and he only read books with a creationist bias. We can now imagine that I happen to                   
meet Craig, and upon hearing of his creationist view, offer him some books on the topic which discuss the                   
evolutionary viewpoint. However, Craig blindly refuses to read them, not wishing for his beliefs to be                
challenged.  
 
From this information, it would appear that Craig's initial belief in creationism satisfies the standards for                
synchronic rationality (as his beliefs fit the evidence he had at the time, prior to our conversation), but he                   
fails on diachronic rationality, i.e. an assessment of rationality across time. If we focus on the time in                  
which I offered Craig the evolutionary books and he refused to read them, this arguably appears to be a                   
case of ​epistemic irresponsibility. Craig had plenty of free time to read the books if he desired, and they                   
are relatively short. By refusing to do so, however, he appears to be willfully ignorant, which is                 
5 ​As an evidentialist, Dougherty (2012) claims that 'lack of evidential fit' is a genuine epistemic criticism which one 
is blameworthy for. 
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epistemically irresponsible. Upon closer examination, however, Dougherty argues that the irresponsibility           
at hand is really a case of moral or instrumental irresponsibility. Dougherty argues for this statement by                 
appealing to stakes, claiming that either there is something at stake for Craig, or not. If there is ​not                   
something at stake, then Craig does nothing irresponsible or blameworthy in not being over-scrupulous in               
his creationist beliefs. If, on the other hand, there is ​something at stake for Craig, then it either relates to                    
his own interests or the interests of others. If the former, then it would be instrumentally irresponsible and                  
irrational for Craig to continue to sustain his beliefs in creationism, for he is actively believing in a                  
falsehood which is a personal disadvantage to him. If the stakes regard the interests of others, as we have                   
a duty to promote the interests of others, Craig's beliefs would be deemed morally irresponsible. As such,                 
Dougherty explains away the intuitive attribution of epistemic irresponsibility to Craig's action by             
reducing it to cases of instrumental and moral irresponsibility. The form of blameworthiness which we               
would attribute here would be either instrumental or moral, as it would only be appropriate to blame Craig                  
epistemically if there was something epistemically at stake, which there is not. 
In summary, Dougherty is claiming that perceived cases of epistemic blame can be reduced to cases of                 
moral or instrumental blame. Applying a form of Ockham's razor, there is no need to overcomplicate                
matters by arguing for a new species of blame, which only distracts from the other types of blame we                   
should be really focusing on. 
 
3.2 Boult's Epistemic Blame Scepticism 
 
 
Having outlined Dougherty's sceptical arguments against epistemic blame, we can now analyse the             
arguments of another proponent of the view, offered by Boult (​draft​).  
Boult's argument against epistemic blame is similar to Dougherty's in its reductionist methodology, and              
the belief that epistemic blame is really a form of moral or practical blame. Boult presents his view in the                    
form of 'The Toy Argument', which I will now outline. 
 
Boult opens his argument with the following scenario; 
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Apple 1: Bill is staring directly at a red apple that is sitting on a table in good lighting. He hasn’t missed                      
any obvious defeaters, and he's normally reliable in distinguishing types of fruit under these sorts of                
conditions. With this information taken into account, Bill believes that there is a red apple on the table. 
Apple 2: In a second scenario, Bill comes to form the belief (under the same conditions), that there is not                    
a red apple on the table, but that either: 
A) There is a green apple on the table 
B) There is no apple on the table  
C) There is a pear on the table  
 
Having outlined these examples, Boult turns to consider what our reaction towards Bill's belief in A, B or                  
C would be. Boult claims that he would feel puzzled at Bill's belief, even concerned for his health. What                   
he would not feel, he states, is any sense that Bill's belief is blameworthy, arguing that to do so would be                     
inappropriate. Even with the inclusion of further details, for example, if Bill was informed that if he                 
arrived at the wrong belief, his brother would be shot, epistemic blameworthiness is still not attributable.                
This is because Boult argues, it would not be clear what type of blameworthiness would be attributable in                  
this scenario, particularly if it was distinctively a form of epistemic blameworthiness. Unless we fleshed               
out the details of the scenario to provoke intuitions about moral or practical blameworthiness, it seems                
wrong to blame Bill in any distinctively epistemic sense. From this, Boult makes the following argument; 
'The Toy Argument' 
1.) It doesn't seem natural to blame someone for an epistemic failing unless something moral or practical                 
is at stake. 
2.) If 1) is true, then there is no such thing as distinctively epistemic blameworthiness 
3.) So, there is no such thing as distinctively epistemic blameworthiness 
(Boult, ​draft​, p.4) 
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To further illustrate his point, like Dougherty, Boult also details an example to demonstrate how epistemic                
blameworthiness collapses into either moral or instrumental blame by explaining away an intuitive sense              
of epistemic blameworthiness.  
 
Stan and the Sun 
Stan is an astronomy student who was recently taught by a professor that the Sun is approximately 98                   
million miles away from Earth. Stan, however, always believed the Sun is much closer to the earth and is                   
determined to hold onto his belief. He therefore rejects his professor's assertion and willfully chooses to                
be ignorant. As with Dougherty's 'Craig the Creationist' case, it appears we can attribute epistemic               
blameworthiness towards Stan's willful ignorance. Stan should believe his professor who is better             
informed on the topic than he is, so it appears we can epistemically blame Stan for actively ​choosing ​to                   
believe in a falsehood .  
6
 
Boult argues that the type of blame we wish to attribute towards Stan is better understood as moral or                   
instrumental blame, despite it appearing to be epistemic. For example, if Stan is willing to disregard                
scientific findings on simple matters, then what else is he willing to also ignore? What will happen when                  
Stan takes on instructive roles for example, or what example does he set for others around him? Taking                  
these questions into account, Boult highlights that what is at stake with Stan's belief is either moral or                  
instrumental. Furthermore, if we take these stakes away, such as by allowing Stan's refusal to believe to                 
be a one-off occurrence, the blameworthiness seems to be eradicated. Boult argues that with this in mind,                 
it seems too heavy-handed to attribute any sense of blameworthiness to Stan. What Boult's example seems                
to demonstrate here is that seemingly intuitive cases of epistemic blameworthiness are better understood              
as examples of moral or instrumental blameworthiness. When we examine what is at stake, we find that it                  
is either moral or instrumental, and the relevant blameworthiness stems from this. When nothing is at                
stake, we do not feel we must attribute any form of blame. 
Having outlined the key components of Boult's sceptical stance, it is evident that both Boult’s and                
Dougherty’s arguments bear a great resemblance to one another. Whilst the parallels have yet to be                
6 ​I am aware that this type of case assumes doxastic voluntarism which is contentious (see Williams, 1970). 
However, due to word count limitations I will not be discussing this debate. 
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discussed in literature, it is clear that both sceptics offer a reductionist objection to epistemic blame,                
reducing intuitive examples of such to moral or instrumental blame. Both sceptics also centre their               
perception of blameworthiness around what is at stake and deny the existence of blameworthiness unless               
there is something moral or practical at stake. Moving on to the critical examination of both these views,                  
the unity of these positions will arguably allow for my objections to address the key components of both                  
Dougherty’s (2012) and Boult’s (​draft) ​sceptical arguments.  
 
4. Nottelmann's Argument for a Distinct Epistemic Blameworthiness 
 
4.1 The Distinctiveness of Epistemic Blame 
 
Having outlined both epistemic blame and epistemic blame scepticism, we can now turn to critically              
assess the views put forth by both Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​). We can begin by presenting an              
argument in favour of a distinct form of epistemic blame, offered by Nottelmann (2007), which           
is discussed and dismissed briefly by both Dougherty and Boult . I will critically assess Dougherty’s and           
Boult's objections, providing a novel defence of Nottelmann argument for epistemic blame.  
7
 
Nottelmann argues for the distinctiveness of epistemic blame by establishing a theory of epistemic              
deontologism built upon epistemic blame. By appealing to legal considerations, Nottelmann makes the             
claim that moral culpability presupposes epistemic culpability, which demonstrates how moral and            
epistemic blame are distinct (2007). Nottelmann opens his argument for this by detailing a ​historic rape                
case from 1975, which caused widespread controversy when three men were not deemed blameworthy for               
their act of rape. The case consisted of three men, who were invited by their friend, Mr. Morgan, to have                    
sexual intercourse with his wife. Mr. Morgan informed his friends that his wife was ‘kinky’ and would                 
feign protest. When arriving at the Morgan household, all four men forcibly dragged Mrs. Morgan from                
her son’s bed where she was sleeping, and each had forcible intercourse without her consent whilst the                 
other men held her down. Mrs. Morgan attempted to scream for her son to call the police but was choked                    
by the men. At the trial, the three men pleaded that they believed Mrs. Morgan had consented to sexual                   
7 ​My argument against Dougherty's rejection of Nottelmann (2007) is a point I have addressed in 'Is Epistemic 
Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?' (​draft​) and will now redevelop.  
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intercourse. In conclusion, The House of Lords held that the men made an honest, but mistaken, belief                 
that Mrs. Morgan was consenting, which provided a complete defence. 
Nottelmann claims that the men should have been considered blameworthy for their actions by arguing               
for a distinctive form of epistemic blameworthiness. From this he argues that if epistemic              
blameworthiness is not reducible to moral blameworthiness, moral blameworthiness must presuppose           
epistemic blameworthiness. Nottelmann locates the blameworthiness of the rape in the men's belief that              
Mrs. Morgan consented to sexual intercourse, stating it has "​epistemically undesirable properties (such as              
unreasonableness)​" (Nottelmann, 2007. p.10). It is this unreasonable belief which motivates the immoral             
act of rape, which leads Nottlemann to make the claim that epistemic culpability is presupposed by moral                 
culpability. He appeals to a classic distinction in law known as the ​actus reus and the ​mens rea                  
distinction, to further this presupposition ​(2007). The ​actus reus refers to the conduct element of a crime,                 
which the defendant must have proven to have done. The ​mens rea is the psychological element of the                  
crime, the intention or forethought which makes one morally culpable. Nottelmann compares the moral              
blameworthiness to the ​actus reus​, and epistemic blameworthiness to the ​mens rea. ​As the intention               
comes prior to the action, ​this means that ​an agent must hold an epistemically undesirable belief prior to                  
carrying the immoral action. This demonstrates how a clear-cut distinction can be made between the two                
forms of blame.  
It is worth noting here that so far, Nottelmann (2007) appears to have demonstrated that there are cases in                   
which the basis for blameworthiness is epistemic, but only with regards to the rape case. It may be true                   
that this is not always the case, and Nottelmann offers little insight as to what other types of cases he also                     
believes the basis for blame is epistemic. However, I do not take this as a concern of Nottelmann's                  
argument, for he arguably does not need more than this modest claim to make his point. If there are                   
examples where epistemic blame comes prior to moral blame, it simply cannot be the case that it reduces                  
to moral blame. An agent must hold an epistemically unreasonable belief prior to the immoral act which                 
the belief stems from, meaning epistemic blame must come prior to moral blame .  
8
In summary, Nottlelmann has argued for a distinctive form of epistemic blame by locating              
blameworthiness in an agent's unreasonable belief. With an appeal to legal considerations, Nottelmann             
has argued that moral culpability presupposes epistemic culpability, which demonstrates how moral and             
epistemic blame are distinct.  
8 I thank Mona Simion for raising this point in personal conversation. 
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4.2 Dougherty’s Objection to Nottlemann’s Position 
 
Having briefly summarized Nottelmann's (2007) main argument for the distinctiveness of epistemic            
blame we can now turn to examine the concerns raised with his view by both Dougherty (2012) and Boult                   
(​draft​). In this next section, I will detail both Dougherty's and Boult's responses to Nottelmann's argument                
before moving on to defend Nottelmann’s position. I will achieve this by presenting my own critical                
responses to their objections, which I will raise on Nottelmann’s behalf.  
Dougherty rejects Nottelmann's position by arguing that just because the target of the blameworthiness is               
the belief, it does not follow that the nature of the blame is epistemic; beliefs can also be governed by                    
moral, prudential norms (2012). Additionally, Dougherty claims that blame is located in the moral              
consequences of the act itself, and this is distinctively moral, not epistemic. Taking both of Dougherty's                
concerns into consideration, it seems Nottelmann fails to locate epistemic blameworthiness in the belief of               
a guilty agent or demonstrate how the blameworthiness we speak of is distinctively epistemic. It thus                
appears that Nottelmann fails to successfully argue for the distinctiveness of epistemic blame by              
appealing to the priority of epistemic blame over moral blame. 
Despite Dougherty's concern, I believe we can resist his objection by claiming that the denial of epistemic                 
irresponsibility results in the eradication of any moral irresponsibility too. If this commitment is correct,               
then it demonstrates how epistemic responsibility must come prior to moral responsibility, as Nottelmann              
originally claimed. So how can one deny the existence of epistemic irresponsibility? One could argue that                
the rapists may have searched for more evidence about Mr. Morgan's claim that his wife wanted to                 
partake in sexual intercourse and found positive reasons to believe it, or perhaps they had no way to                  
improve their epistemic situation, for example they had no epistemic defeaters against the claim. Despite               
the intuition that the three men were aware Mr. Morgan was lying, these epistemic situations do not seem                  
too far-fetched. With this in mind, how does denying any claims of epistemic responsibility deny claims                
of moral responsibility? If we argue that there was nothing the men could do to better their situation and                   
were therefore truly justified in believing that Mrs. Morgan enjoyed non-consensual sexual intercourse,             
there no longer seems to be any attribution of blame, moral or epistemic. Their epistemic situation may, at                  
most, make them ignorant, but not culpably ignorant.  
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We can apply Goldman's case of the 'benighted cognizer' (1988) here to explain this point further, which I                  
believe strengthens my response to Dougherty. Goldman details a society which uses unreliable methods              
to form beliefs about the future. The society uses astrology and oracles to assist in belief formation, thus                  
ignoring proper scientific practice. We can imagine that a member of this society forms a belief about the                  
outcome of an upcoming battle based on zodiacal signs. Goldman refers to this individual as a benighted                 
cognizer, someone who has formed a belief via bad methods but knows no better way to inform himself.                  
Arguably, it seems wrong to attribute any type of blame to the benighted cognizer for his faulty belief                  
formation, despite the potentially disastrous consequences, for the individual has good reason to trust his               
cultural peers and has no way of acquiring better belief formation methods. We therefore find it hard to                  
fault or blame them for believing what they do.  
Bringing our argument back to Dougherty's objection, we can argue in defence of Nottelmann that               
blameworthiness is not located in the moral consequences of the act itself, for all moral consequences are                 
eradicated if epistemic responsibility is also eradicated. The cognizer appears to be epistemically justified              
in their belief, and this excuses any sort of epistemic blameworthiness. It thus appears that blame can be                  
distinctively epistemic and ​presuppose moral blameworthiness, for the men escape any attributions of             
moral blameworthiness if they are not deemed epistemically blameworthy.  
It is also worth noting here a possible response from Dougherty against my defence of Nottelmann which                 
we must address. Goldman's case of the benighted cognizer is similar to Dougherty's own case of Craig                 
the creationist, where Craig also formed faulty beliefs under bad epistemic situations. With this in mind,                
perhaps it is possible for Dougherty to appeal to the same argument for this and claim that the benighted                   
cognizer was not morally blameworthy, as nothing was at stake for him. This way, the reason we do not                   
intuitively want to attribute blame does not rest upon there not being any attribution of epistemic blame.                 
However, I think it seems quite clear that there is something at stake for the benighted cognizer, (e.g. the                   
battle could go wrong), and yet, we still do not attribute blame. It seems then that Dougherty would be                   
wrong to argue that cases which are not blameworthy are cases where nothing is at stake, meaning blame                  
is not necessary located in what is at stake morally or practically, for there are cases of such where we do                     





4.3 Boult’s Objection to Nottelmann’s Position  
 
We can now turn to critically examine the second sceptical objection offered against Nottelmann's (2007)               
argument for epistemic distinctiveness, presented by Boult (​draft​). Boult grants Nottelmann's claim that             
moral and legal blameworthiness may be located in the unreasonableness of a belief yet argues that a                 
“significant leap is required to get from appropriate attributions of epistemic unreasonableness to             
appropriate attributions of epistemic blameworthiness​” (​Boult, ​draft, ​p. 15). ​What Boult is arguing here,              
is that a leap is being made by Nottelmann in claiming that the epistemic unreasonableness entails a                 
distinct form of epistemic blameworthiness. Epistemic unreasonableness is not equal to and does not              
necessarily lead to epistemic blameworthiness.  
It thus appears that Boult finds the relationship between unreasonableness and blameworthiness            
problematic. More specifically, the relationship between ​epistemic ​unreasonableness and ​epistemic          
blameworthiness. I believe that exploring this relationship in more depth will expel the possible doubts               
that Boult has raised.  
Nottelmann talks of epistemic unreasonableness as a property of a belief which is undesirable from an                
epistemic perspective. He argues that unreasonableness is epistemically undesirable in the sense that an              
agent holding a belief does not have good and rational reasons for holding the said belief, where 'good                  
and rational reasons' for belief are defined as adequate grounds and adequate evidence. Unreasonableness              
is just one of three other properties which lead to undesirable beliefs. Referring to them as 'epistemic                 
indesiderata', Nottelmann also lists a “​l​ack of formation by a truth-conducive process” and ”inadequate              
basing” as the other two properties (Nottelmann, 2007, p. 70). With this in mind, undesirability is thus                 
defined as "...an agent’s holding of the belief that p is epistemically undesirable if, and only if, it is not                    
formed and sustained by a reliable process, not based on adequate reasons, or unreasonable" (Nottelmann,               
2007, p. 70) 
Having understood unreasonableness as an epistemic notion, we can now examine how it relates to               
blameworthiness, addressing Boult's  concerns.  
Although Nottelmann does not explicitly detail the relationship between unreasonableness and           
blameworthiness regards to the 1975 rape case, we can still succinctly apply his reasoning here to assist                 
with our illustration.  
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The three rapists formed the belief that Mrs. Morgan was consenting to sexual intercourse. This belief is                 
unreasonable in the sense that the men had inadequate grounds to believe Mr. Morgan's claim, and it is                  
epistemic in the sense that it concerns the lack of good or rational reasons of a belief. In order to establish                     
blameworthiness, we must consider whether the men may be excused in any way. It seems that                
Nottelmann (2007) would argue that the men may be excused only if their unreasonableness can be                
excused. What is meant by this, is that the men can be said to hold an unreasonable belief, but their                    
reasons for doing so are excusable. For example, one could argue that the men had very low IQ's, so could                    
not determine that Mr. Morgan was lying. Whether this excuse is credible or not, the main concern is that                   
unless no good enough excuses can be made, the men cannot be considered blameworthy for the harm                 
caused by their action, and this is based on an appeal to the epistemic notion of unreasonableness. Moral                  
blameworthiness therefore stems from an agent holding an unreasonable belief which cannot be excused.              
It thus arises that moral blameworthiness must presuppose epistemic blameworthiness, for blame must             
first be attributed to epistemic unreasonableness in one's belief.  
We can bring the discussion back to Boult's (​draft​) concerns on the relationship between epistemic               
unreasonableness and blameworthiness. It now seems clear how Nottelmann manages to argue that             
blameworthiness originates in the unreasonableness of an agent's belief, and how this is a distinct form of                 
epistemic blame which gives way to moral blame. ​Whilst epistemic unreasonableness does not             
necessarily give way to blame, it only fails to do so in cases where the unreasonableness can be excused,                   
resulting in no attributions of blame, epistemic or otherwise being attributed. ​This in turn further               
demonstrates the locus of blame in the epistemic unreasonableness of an agent's belief. ​It is also worth                 
noting here that Nottelmann does not argue that only unreasonable beliefs lead to blameworthiness.              
Blame can also be attributed through any of the other previously discussed properties which he deems                
epistemically undesirable, and we should be critical of analysing blame with regards to just epistemic               
unreasonableness. With this in mind, Boult's ruling out of the connection between epistemic             
unreasonableness and blameworthiness does not necessarily shed doubt on the distinctiveness of            
epistemic blameworthiness.  
In this section, we have outlined Nottelmann’s argument in favour of a distinct form of epistemic blame.                 
We then outlined and critically examined Dougherty and Boult’s objections to Nottelmann’s position, in              
turn offering new defences for Nottelmann’s position.  
 
17 
5. Epistemic Purism 
 
5.1 Explaining Epistemic Purism 
 
I will now turn to critically assess another objection to epistemic blame. The argument, known as 'the                 
argument from epistemic purism', is put forth by Boult in favour of epistemic scepticism. I take this to be                   
one of the strongest arguments offered against epistemic blame, as, if true, it commits epistemic blame                
advocates to a position which makes the sceptic’s argument stronger. Furthermore, it appears that denying               
this commitment comes at significant costs. I will now dedicate this section to exploring this objection in                 
full. 
Boult’s argument from epistemic purism concerns his understanding of the epistemic normative domain             
as isolated from other normative domains.  
Epistemic Purism (EP): Evaluations made from the epistemic perspective comprise a distinct normative             
domain; they do not, qua epistemic evaluation, involve practical, moral, or other kinds of normative               
considerations.  
(Boult, ​draft​, p.9) 
Boult argues that proponents of epistemic blame may attempt to reject epistemic purism, arguing that the                
epistemic domain is not as distinct from the moral and practical domain as Boult claims. For example,                 
Zagzebski (2003) claims that epistemic value is closely connected to moral value and the wider values of                 
the good life, arguing that it would be unlikely that epistemic value would be autonomous. This is just one                   
of the ways that Boult considers epistemic blamers may resist his view and argues that if this is correct, it                    
would allow one to resist premise two of his 'Toy Argument', outlined earlier as:  
 
1.) It doesn't seem natural to blame someone for an epistemic failing unless something moral or 
practical is at stake. 
2.) If 1) is true, then there is no such thing as distinctively epistemic blameworthiness 
3.) So, there is no such thing as distinctively epistemic blameworthiness 
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(Boult, ​draft​, p.4) 
 
It appears that premise 2 depends on the notion of a distinctly epistemic evaluation, meaning a rejection                 
of epistemic purism would allow one to respond by claiming that practical and moral stakes are ​always                 
involved in our understanding of epistemic evaluation. 
However, Boult notes that denying epistemic purism comes at a significant cost, which is far greater than                 
the benefits of a distinct form of epistemic blameworthiness. Boult argues that it is highly implausible that                 
we cannot epistemically evaluate people and beliefs in the absence of any considerations about stakes. We                
can judge whether one has a rational or justified belief whether or not something important is on the line.                   
With this in mind, Boult states that the concept of epistemic blameworthiness is no different. Further to                 
this, Boult argues that a lot of the literature in contemporary epistemology has a deep commitment to                 
epistemic purism. For example, even pragmatic encroachment, a view which looks like it rejects              
epistemic purism, endorses it. In short, pragmatic encroachment is the view that the amount of evidence                
or warrant required for an agent to possess justification or knowledge that p, is influenced by practical                 
stakes (Stanley, 2005). This appears like an endorsement of epistemic purism; however, it is noticeably               
distinguishable. Pragmatic encroachment is the thesis that the truth and falsity of a certain epistemic               
judgement can vary with pragmatic factors, such as the practical stakes (McGrath, 2018). As Boult (​draft​)                
notes, with regards to epistemic purism, a rejection of such would involve the claim that epistemic                
evaluation​ itself ​is a part of a practical or moral evaluation. 
Whilst Dougherty does not explicitly raise the same objection as Boult, I believe he also shares a similar                  
view in favour of the isolation of the epistemic domain. When responding to an objection on the apparent                  
overlap of the ethics of belief and epistemology, Dougherty (2014) argues that whilst it may appear that                 
the two disciplines overlap, there is, in fact, a discrete distinction between the two. Dougherty appeals to                 
Aristotle’s (2009) claim that some disciplines take as their first principles items proved in lower               
disciplines. He refers to an example offered by Aquinas, that the science of music is based on the science                   
of arithmetic (1947). However, this does not make musical composition a branch of mathematics, for a                
skilled and ambitious composer ​might also be a mathematician, just as many exceptional physicists are               
also skilled mathematicians. Dougherty notes that one act, under the same aspect, is not an instance of                 
both music and mathematics. One might wear both their musical and mathematical hat, but not at the                 
same time, and they may be changed so quickly we do not notice. 
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5.2   Against Epistemic Purism 
 
One could argue that Boult's understanding and division of the normative domains is far more troubling                
than the epistemic blame advocate’s potential commitment to epistemic purism. If so, this objection              
would also be concerning for Dougherty's version of epistemic scepticism.  
It is worth reminding ourselves that both Boult and Dougherty offer reductionist arguments in favour of                
epistemic scepticism. Both sceptics claim that epistemic blameworthiness is a disguised form of moral or               
instrumental blameworthiness, and therefore is not a distinct field of blame. Taking this reductionist              
approach to the normative domains, however, can be problematic. Using an argument offered in defence               
of epistemic deontology against reductionism, I will now outline how this demonstrates how Dougherty              
and Boult's methodology is concerning. 
Epistemic dentologism is the view that there are certain duties pertaining to a distinct epistemic domain                
which we are subject to ​qua rational beings (Booth, 2008). Sceptical arguments, similar to those offered                
by Boult ​(draft​) and Dougherty (2012, 2014), are also used to object against the possibility of distinct                 
epistemic duties. Epistemic duty sceptics argue that epistemic duties can be reduced to moral or practical                
duties, meaning there is no need for a distinct epistemic deontology. The main advocate of this view is                  
Wrenn (2007), who, in short, argues that if distinct forms of epistemic duties existed they would conflict                 
with our other type of obligations, such as our moral, legal and prudential duties. When it appears to be                   
that we have an epistemic duty conflicting with another source of obligation, what we really have is a                  
disguised moral duty competing with some other non-epistemic requirement. Thus, epistemic obligations            
simply do not exist.  
To support his view, Wrenn gives an example of what he refers to as 'parental duties': duties one has ​qua                    
parent. For example, if A is the parent of B, A would be said to have certain obligations towards B, just                     
because they are a parent of B. Wrenn argues that one can reasonably deny that the source of parental                   
duties is based only in the fact that A is a parent. For example, the source of these duties may be moral, as                       
one has a moral duty to care for their child. It therefore seems that the basis or root of the parental duty in                       
question is moral, yet is defined as a parental duty in the sense that it is a 'parent-related moral duty'.                    
Wrenn offers this example to show how certain duties that we perceive ourselves and others to possess                 
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can be reduced to moral duties. Wrenn believes this reductionist line of thought can also be applied to our                   
perceived epistemic obligations.  
Whilst no parallels have been made between the literature to date, I believe the similarities between                
Wrenn's reductionist objection to epistemic duties bears a clear resemblance to Dougherty's and Boult's              
reductionist objection towards epistemic blameworthiness. With this in mind, we can explore an objection              
to Wrenn’s position which arguably also undermines both Dougherty’s and Boult’s position. The             
objection I will detail is offered by Stapleford in his '​Why There May Be Epistemic Duties' ​(2015) paper.                  
Stapleford defends the distinctiveness of epistemic duties against Wrenn by demonstrating how Wrenn's             
reductionist reasoning leads to some problematic and odd consequences. Stapleford's aim is to offer a               
reductio against Wrenn's argument, demonstrating the implausibility of the collapsing of epistemic duties             
into others.  
Whilst Stapleford does not offer a positive argument for the possibility of epistemic duties, he arguably                
highlights how the reductionist reasoning is ineffective in dismissing the possibility of epistemic duties.              
As already outlined, this reasoning is employed by Dougherty and Boult to argue for their epistemic                
scepticism stance. The epistemic sceptic (now understood in both senses of duty and blameworthiness)              
argues that all cases of epistemic blame or epistemic duties can be reduced to moral blameworthiness or                 
moral duties. However, Stapleford argues that cases where there is a legal duty or blame, which also                 
imposes a moral duty or blame, should be reduced to ​just cases of moral duties or blame by the                   
reductionist methodology. For example, it seems to be the case that situations which pose a legal duty to                  
do x, also imposes a moral duty to do x, in the sense that laws are often perceived as providing guidance                     
for promoting fairness (Marmor, 2005, 2006). However, it seems right that we want to keep legal and                 
moral duties distinct; what is considered legal is not always considered to be moral. For the reductionist,                 
however, it cannot be true that we have ​both legal and moral obligations, for reductionism demands that                 
we simplify legal duties or legal forms of blameworthiness into moral duties and blameworthiness.              
Stapleford argues that this line of reasoning also applies to instrumental duties. Instrumental duties can be                
understood as legal duties in that it is beneficial to conform one's actions to the law. Take for example                   
paying taxes, not speeding or running red lights, here it is instrumentally good to conform to one's legal                  
duties to avoid fines or imprisonment. This is puzzling then when we realize that cases of what seems like                   
a prudential duty can be collapsed into legal duties, and legal duties can be reduced to moral duties. The                   
same applies to blameworthiness. Failing to carry out one of these practical duties may seem practically                
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blameworthy, which in turn can be reduced to legal blameworthiness, which can be understood even               
further as moral blameworthiness.  
It appears then that the very same reductionist reasoning employed by epistemic blame and normative               
sceptics creates a total collapse of the normative realms. Stapleford argues that this is extremely               
concerning for the epistemic normativity sceptic, for they need to preserve the autonomy of the moral                
realm to make the claim that epistemic obligations are really disguised moral requirements. For this claim                
to be considered as credible, it cannot preclude genuine legal and prudential requirements, for we readily                
do recognise these as independent sources of obligation. One way I believe the epistemic sceptic may                
attempt to push back from these consequences would be to bite the bullet and accept that only moral                  
sources of blameworthiness or obligation exist. However, this is not the conclusion that either Wrenn               
(2007) , Dougherty (2012) or Boult (​draft​) would be willing to accept, and when pitted against the                 
non-sceptic who allows for the possibility of epistemic, moral, legal and prudential sources, it arguably               
looks very unappealing.  
 
6. A Semantic Objection 
 
Moving on to the final section of this paper, I will now present my own objection against Dougherty’s and                   
Boult’s sceptical argument against epistemic blameworthiness . Both Dougherty and Boult are keen to              
9
emphasise the importance of their sceptical debate and the effect that eliminating epistemic blame will               
have on the epistemic normative domain. Nevertheless, I will argue that despite these claims, the               
consequences of the sceptical position is not as strong as both Dougherty and Boult desire it to be. It is                    
possible to grant the sceptic’s claim that epistemic blame is not a distinct form of blame, however, the                  
impact this would have on the notion of epistemic blame is just semantical.  
Both Dougherty and Boult, however, are clear to emphasize that their objection has more than just                
terminological consequences, claiming that their scepticism of epistemic blameworthiness has an impact            
on multiple areas of epistemology. For example, Dougherty states that if his argument is successful, it will                 
require a serious re-thinking of epistemic responsibility. The debate also impacts whether evidentialism is              
true, for if standard responsibilists are right, evidentialism is false; the ethics of belief goes well beyond                 
9 ​This a development of a point I raised in the conclusion of my earlier paper ‘Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from 
Moral Blame?’ (​draft​). 
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consideration of evidence. Boult also argues that the dispute between sceptics and proponents of              
epistemic blameworthiness is more than terminological. Again, this is based on the importance of the               
debate, and the impact that dismissing epistemic blame has for evidentialism, blameless norm violations              
and blameworthy assertion, to name a few. Furthermore, Dougherty also argues that even the semantics of                
the debate is important. When addressing the seriousness of the taxonomy of epistemic blameworthiness,              
Dougherty argues that getting rid of epistemic blameworthiness reminds us that we should be doing the                
ethics of inquiry when investigating perceived cases of epistemic irresponsibility. ​In Dougherty’s own             
words, instead of trying to ​“‘pervert’ epistemology by remaking it in the image of ethics, we should                 
‘become perverts’ and actually practice ethics​” (Dougherty, 2014, p.164). 
Despite the claims made by Dougherty and Boult, I believe that their epistemic blame scepticism is only                 
semantically worrying at most. Even with their sceptical argument granted, Dougherty and Boult’s claims              
would mean that instead of referring to actions as epistemically blameworthy, we would instead refer to                
them as morally or practically blameworthy, with epistemic shortcomings or consequences. These cases,             
although now semantically classed as cases of moral or practical blame, could still be studied by                
epistemologists in the sense they are still heavily related to the domain.  
Perhaps it would be possible for Dougherty or Boult to resist my objection and argue that there would be                   
no value in continuing to study examples of such in an epistemic light. I believe this objection does have                   
some appeal, so will now demonstrate how we can resist this claim and argue such cases would still be                   
epistemically relevant.  
Take, for example, a parent who chooses not to vaccinate their child as they believe doing so will result in                    
them having autism. They base this belief on an anti-vaccine poster they received through the post. It                 
seems reasonable to claim that the parent has formed a false belief and that this excuses us from making a                    
moral claim of blameworthiness about the parent’s decision, which could cause potential harm to              
hundreds of people. However, it may be possible that practical blameworthiness could be attributed, as               
there may be more costs associated if their child is ill. Giving the epistemic sceptic the benefit of the                   
doubt, we can argue that this intuitive case of epistemic of blameworthiness, can be reduced to practical                 
blameworthiness. However, this doesn't deny the epistemic relevance or importance of the case. For              
example, questions such as ‘what counts as a false belief?’, ‘when does a false belief excuse moral                 
blameworthiness?’, ‘what ought one form a belief on?’ can be raised from this case of practical                
blameworthiness which are still epistemically relevant in their relation to knowledge and justification, as              
well as still being normative. 
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Consequently, it appears that even if we grant that all cases of epistemic blameworthiness are really cases                 
of moral or practical blameworthiness, they can still be epistemically relevant, even in a normative sense.                
Therefore, if epistemic scepticism is correct, all that is entailed is just a new way of classifying, or                  





The purpose of this paper was to defend a distinct form of epistemic blame against two proponents of                 
epistemic blame scepticism, Dougherty (2012) and Boult (​draft​). In order to successfully defend          
epistemic blame, I first appealed to Nottlemann’s (2007) argument for the distinctiveness of epistemic            
blame. I then offered an original defence of Nottelmann’s position, critically examining two objections          
proposed by Dougherty and Boult in opposition of his view. Next, I responded to what I perceived as the                  
strongest objection against epistemic blame, known as the argument from epistemic purism. I discovered              
similarities between this objection, originally offered by Boult, and Dougherty’s dismissal​ ​of the overlap             
between the ethics of belief and epistemology, therefore directing​ ​my counter-argument at both of their            
objections. In responding to their concerns I included a new application of Stapleford’s (2015) defence of              
epistemic duties, after discovering similarities in Dougherty and Boult’s reductionist methodology which            
resembled Wrenn’s (2007) reductionist approach to epistemic duties. Despite the fact that parallels in the               
literature had yet to be explored, I found Stapleford’s ​reductio​ against Wrenn's argument successfully            
established the problematic consequences and thus implausibility of epistemic scepticism. From here, I            
constructed a novel objection against epistemic scepticism which highlighted how, if granted, Dougherty           
and Boult’s scepticism would only have a minor, semantical impact on the study of epistemic blame. This              
objection drastically reduced the force of the sceptical position, demonstrating how epistemic blame is            
still relevant in a normative sense.  
 
This paper invites many areas for further research from those interested in epistemic blame, as well as                
influencing other contemporary debates in epistemology, including those concerning epistemic          
normativity and applied philosophy. An example of further study could be to investigate whether similar               
sceptical arguments can be proposed against all accounts of epistemic blame, and not just the traditionalist                
and cognitive account. Additionally, this paper invites more positive arguments for epistemic blame to be               
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put forth, as there is a current gap in the literature for papers which argue for, and not just in defence, of                      
epistemic blame.  
 
The importance of this debate is not to go amiss. As highlighted by Nottelmann (2007), defending the                 
notion of epistemic blame determines whether one can be epistemically blamed for not believing, or               
possessing inexcusable reasons not to believe, which is extremely relevant for determining legal liability.              
Giving the popularity of epistemic blame, a defence of it also opens up areas of investigation into                 
epistemic blame as a social practice, the situations on which we attribute blame and what we are doing in                   
such contexts. These are just two ways in which the distinctiveness of epistemic blame influences other                
areas of epistemology.  
 
For now, however, we can conclude this paper by declaring that epistemic blame and its place in the                  
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